UA Library

Journal of Arizona History 15 (Summer 1974): 119-138.


Governor Hunt, the "Beast" and the Miners

By Marjorie Haynes Wilson

THROUGHOUT HIS LONG and controversial political career, Governor George W. P. Hurst was a champion of Arizona labor. He battled for the workers, made them his personal friends and tended to idealize them. Some of his longest and most revealing letters were to miners and railroad men. "Many an uncouth miner," he wrote to a friend, "has words of wisdom to fall from his lips."1

These feelings questionably increased his popularity among the rank and file but they brought him into conflict with the corporations—"The Beast," as he called them—and throughout most of his seven terms in office he was waging war, or at least skirmishing, with these powerful foes. The war years (1915-1917) were the times of severest stress.

The root of the conflict was Arizona’s dependence on outside help in developing her resources. Obviously, local capital was not sufficient to open the mines or establish the railroads and the utilities on which the mines depended. Absentee capitalism could not help dominating the economic life of Arizona, and it would have been astonishing if the corporations had not dominated the state’s political life as well. A legislator whose constituents depended on a corporation for their well being did not find it difficult to rationalize his support of that company’s political aims.

A native of Bozeman, Montana, Dr. Wilson is a graduate of the University of California at Berkeley. She was awarded a Ph.D. in History in 1973 at Arizona State. Her field of interest is twentieth-century Arizona. She is one of a handful of scholars in this neglected field.

A primary concern of the corporations was tax legislation. When tax bills were pending, representatives of mining companies swarmed through the capitol, lobbying for lower rates and fewer regulations.2 Commenting on this situation in 1915, Governor Hunt predicted that since fifteen of the mining companies paid one-fourth of the state’s tax revenue, they would undoubtedly get their way in the legislature.3 Actually the mines were paying almost twenty-eight per cent of the taxes in 1915. War prosperity brought this percentage to a peak of fifty-eight per cent in 1918, from which it declined to forty-two per cent in 1925. In 1900 the rate had been only eight per cent. Part of the increase was due to growth, but it was primarily the result of a new system of tax valuation devised in 1916 by the state tax commission.4

Such a high percentage of the total tax burden did not mean, however, that the mines were excessively, or even equitably, taxed. It was certainly not equitable to tax mine land at the same per-acre rate as farm land, but the tax commission was prohibited from assessing anything but the mining property (real estate).5 Mines were favored also by the absence of a severance tax.

Hunt was convinced that the corporations were not adequately taxed. Some of the most important mines, for example, were owned by a Scottish syndicate which, Hunt claimed, paid more income tax to the crown than it paid in state taxes.6 In dealing with the corporations on this explosive issue, Hunt was not susceptible to bribes and threats. "The mining cos," he declared, "have never forgiven me because they were forced to pay taxes."7 There were attempts to bribe him, but Hunt was personally incorruptible.

During Hunt’s first term, the corporations demanded the right to name at least two of the three members of the tax commission. When the governor indignantly refused, they began to attack him both publicly and privately.

Publicly, the attack centered on Hunt’s prison reforms and his views on capital punishment, both topics lending themselves well to fear propaganda. Privately, the corporations attacked him through his business interests in Globe. They acquired a controlling interest in the Old Dominion Commercial Company and the Old Dominion Bank and informed him that if he remained with the company, he would be "relegated to some minor position." Hunt naturally refused to consider such an offer and sold his shares on the same day.8 "I realized that if they could go into the company and secure a majority of the stock to teach me a lesson that the money I had received for my stock…should be invested in such a manner that I would be free to act, as Governor…without annoyance from any source."9

Hunt’s opposition to the mining men, it must be admitted, was selective. He supported the corporations when he thought they needed his help and for years he campaigned for tariffs to protect Arizona’s mines from foreign competition. Neither did the Corporations regard themselves as principals in a blood feud. Each side had a set of goals and when those goals coincided, they cooperated amicably. When they did not, the governor and the capitalists fought each other with considerable skill in the arenas of politics, economics and public opinion.

Tension between capital and organized labor reached its greatest intensity during the industrial troubles of the First World War, but it began before Statehood. During the early 1900s the workingmen showed increasing enthusiasm for unionization while the capitalists made every effort to keep them from organizing. Widespread progressive sentiment had enabled organized labor to play an important role in the constitutional convention in spite of its small membership. The railway brotherhoods were the only unions claiming statewide membership in 1910 but the situation was changing. Mine workers had a fairly strong union in Globe and lesser unions in some of the other mining camps. The Western Federation of Miners was in the process of shedding its radical associations, especially the Industrial Workers of the World, and under the name of the International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers, was about tot return to the American Federation of Labor.

At the outbreak of World War I, the copper industry went into a decline because of the attacks on shipping. Copper prices soon rose again, however, as did wages. But wages did not keep pace with the rising cost of living. As a result, workers became more interested in the potential of unionization and the mine owners became more vulnerable to that kind of pressure. At the same time radical labor, in the form of the IWW, became free of the restraining influence of the WFM and moved to take advantage of the situation in Arizona, where almost half of American copper was produced.

In 1915 a major strike broke out in the mining towns of Clifton and Morenci in Greenlee county. The complaints were familiar. The Clifton-Morenci district was an isolated area where mine workers felt trapped, not only by geography, but by every aspect of life, As in many mining camps, the companies owned most of the houses and stores, the water and power plants, and the hospital.

In addition, the wages in the district were the lowest mining wages in Arizona. Seventy per cent of the workers were Mexican, Mexican-American, or Yaqui; the rest were Anglos who had the best jobs and received better wages, and often oppressed their subordinates with petty graft.10

In the summer of 1915, the workers in the Clifton-Morenci district called in a WFM organizer and a few weeks later, on 14 September, they decided to strike. Although the workers had expected authorization from WFM headquarters, the parent organization at that time lacked the finances to support a strike.11

All the mines in the district were closed but there was no disorder; Governor Hunt, who was in constant communication with Sheriff Jim Cash of Greenlee County, decided his presence in the strike area was not yet needed.12 When a week had passed, however, and the mine managers refused even to meet with the workers, Sheriff Cash asked hunt to attempt a settlement.13

Hunt was less than pleased with the conduct of the mine managers, although he recognized that they received their orders from the owners.14 "The poor mexican," he declared, was "working for a pittance" under conditions of "feudalism."15 The conduct of the strikers, on the other hand, received his public approval, for there had been no violence and the workers appeared willing to wait patiently for weeks if necessary. Speaking to the miners at a rally in Clifton, the governor praised them for their restraint and declared that a compromise must be reached because the workers "are the source of all wealth" and "the time has come when the men and women who toil in this district should have justice…."16

On the same day, the mine managers informed Hunt that they could not possibly reach a settlement, because, they claimed, the WFM controlled the district and the fault therefore lay with the union because it had called the strike.17 With this temporary impasse, Hunt returned to the capital and issued a statement on the strike situation. The wages in the Clifton-Morenci district, Hunt pointed out, were much lower than in other districts and there was no uniform scale, so that Anglos received more pay than Mexicans for the same work. The managers had insisted that they would not meet with the men at all until some time in the vague future, when the men’s behavior might meet with the managers’ approval and the WFM had been expelled from the district. Hunt was indignant at the managers’ demands. "No self-respecting…workmen would submit to such humiliating conditions," he contended.18 Two days later he ordered a small national guard unit into the district to help keep order, cautioning the officer in charge to cooperate with Sheriff Cash, who had handled the situation well so far, and to be tactful with all parties involved.19 Unlike most states, Arizona had many union members in the National Guard and Arizona labor therefore did not view the guard as an enemy.20

At the same time, the three mine managers made a dramatic "escape" from the district on the company’s train, claiming that Hunt’s inflammatory speeches had placed their lives in danger. Hunt was totally unsympathetic and informed them that their actions were not only unnecessary, but stupid.21

The managers retorted that the governor himself had made the district unsafe by his speeches and by consorting with the WFM. "Hundreds of our best citizens," they declared, had been driven out by WFM mobs and beaten up.22 Using these fictitious "hundreds" of assaulted citizens as an excuse, the managers set up a supposed refugee camp at Duncan, a few miles away. In fact, however, their intention was to assemble a sufficient number of strikebreakers to reopen the mines. The vigilance of the sheriff and the National Guard prevented them from doing so.23

The managers settled themselves in El Paso, where they agreed finally to talk, but not to arbitrate, and then only if the WFM organizers left the district. This was the utmost that the owners would then permit the managers to do.24 Accordingly, the workers elected seven representatives but the managers refused to meet with them, asserting that the delegates were WFM members. The managers then demanded that a list of fifteen names be submitted from which they would choose five, perhaps expecting that the workers would refuse these conditions.

The meeting finally occurred, though it accomplished nothing, for the managers questioned the five closely for three days and then abruptly dismissed them without listening to any requests or grievances, and with the demand that the men return to work under the old conditions. When a federal mediator offered his services, the managers refused.25

The managers made extensive use of the press to present their version of the strike. A press release, supposedly an account of the conference, had been sent to company-owned newspapers ahead of time and was printed the same afternoon that the meeting was terminated. In addition, the managers attempted to bribe other newspapers to print pictures and stories giving the managers’ version of the strike as a straight news item.26

In an attempt to eliminate Hunt from the scene, the mining companies in October, 1915, initiated a recall move against him, apparently the first time the recall had been used against a governor in the United States. In the recall petition Hunt was accused of attempting to incite and encourage "class hatred and divisions" which had resulted in "near anarchy." The governor was furthermore declared to be "utterly incompetent" and guilty of "wanton and reckless extravagance." The petition, however, failed to collect a significant portion of the nearly 14,000 signatures necessary (twenty-four per cent of the total vote for the governor in the previous election).27

At the end of January, 1916, the men began to go back to work while federal mediators Joseph Myers and Hywell Davies undertook an investigation.28 When the mediators threatened to make their findings public, the companies agreed to compromise. "Those arrogant mine managers," said Hunt, "could neither bulldog or threaten the Sheriff, myself, or the commissioners. It was a bitter pill to them…."29

Under the terms of the settlement the workers received a minimum wage regardless of race, a raise, re-employment, protection against unfair foremen, a grievance committee, and the right to have a local union.30 Although the men got far less than they had originally asked, their achievement was still significant. The companies, however, were still a formidable adversary and a few months after the settlement, they were busily firing union men and replacing them with Mexicans whom they had brought in for that purpose.31

Hunt’s conduct during the Clifton-Morenci strike received a good deal of attention throughout the country, particularly since it was in such contrast to the action of the governor of Colorado during strikes there the year before. In Colorado the labor troubles had ended in the Ludlow Massacre when the governor sided with the mine owners and used the troops at his disposal against the workers and their families.32

The Arizona copper industry was beset by strikes again in 1917 and since a contested election had made Republican Thomas E. Campbell de facto governor, Hunt was unable at first to act in any official capacity. Campbell, who had spent several years as a mine manager in Jerome, was openly biased in favor of the companies, but he was certainly not a fanatical opponent of labor. He did, in fact, have some sympathy for orderly unionization and was inclined to consider some of the workers’ demands quite reasonable.

When a strike broke out in the Globe-Miami district in July, the sheriff immediately deputized a number of his cowboy friends and asked Campbell for help, a request Campbell relayed to Major General H. A. Greene. The local Episcopal minister organized a "Citizens Home Guard" armed with rifles "sequestered by Superior Court Judge Walter Shute."33

By this time the federal government had decided to act in hopes of settling this disruption in a vital war industry and President Woodrow Wilson wired Hunt that he wished him to act as a mediator, a task in which Hunt was to be assisted by a respected union man and justice of the peace, John McBride of Phoenix.34 Hunt wired his acceptance, assuring Wilson that he would be "against the strike, urging the men that this is no time to tie up a great industry upon which the nation is dependent…."35

Campbell arrived in Globe on the 4th of July and decided to set up what he called "undisclosed Martial Law," keeping order with the help of the sheriff’s deputies and the home guard. General Greene’s representative had decided there was no need for troops at the moment, an attitude which shocked Campbell, who was inclined to exaggerate the numbers and importance of the IWW. He considered the officer naïve and made a strong effort to disillusion him, finally succeeding in having a battalion stationed at Globe.36

The strike situation at Globe was complicated by the rivalry by the AFL and the IWW. The strike was called by the IWW. AFL members were advised by their leaders not to cross the picket lines but to await developments. The strategy of the IWW in Arizona, as in other areas, was to destroy existing unions by whatever means presented themselves and then to step into the vacuum.37 During the summer of 1917 they were agitating simultaneously in nearly all of the copper camps in Arizona. The rivalry between the two unions was intense and the destructive activities which characterized the IWW cast a shadow in the public mind over all union activity.

When Campbell offered his services as mediator, the national AFL decided that the Globe problem was too complex and too important for such treatment and insisted on a federal conciliator. Since Hunt was selected as one of the federal representatives, neither Campbell nor the mine managers were pleased.38

Hunt’s attitude toward the IWW was somewhat different from Campbell’s. To Hunt, the miners were individuals, regardless of union affiliation. "These men are our so-called hard rock miners," he explained; "generally they are without homes or wives—but good men nevertheless. their occupation is one of extreme danger….independent and fearless…as to their rights. so that the I.W.W. appeals to them…."39

Understanding the men’s interest in the IWW did not mean that Hunt approved of the aims of that organization. He regarded the union’s methods and aims as irrational and self-defeating and always made an effort to persuade the leaders to adopt a more reasonable course of action. Hunt valued their confidence in him, "but for the safety of society for themselves and for ourselves we must go at the solution in a calmer manner."40

Hunt was convinced that much of the agitation by the IWW in Arizona had been encouraged and financed by the companies themselves, which hoped to discredit all unions through the excesses of the IWW. The companies hired men from the Thiel Detective Agency of Los Angeles to pose as IWWs an infiltrate the local unions. The industrial spy system, said Hunt, had "poisened the whole community." When the system was first introduced,

The man who came there representing the detective agencies, [thought] that I was running company store…after several visits one day he came into my office and told me the whole thing, and wound up by saying that I should come in and that he would put men in the store like they had done in the mines and that what the clerks said and what they did would be reported.

After getting all the information I look him in the eye and told him some truths…he must have taken my view point for he quit the business, but the evil thing had been planted….41

Bona fide members of the IWW were sometimes imported too, but they proved difficult to control.42

In Hunt’s view the mine managers were even more irrational than the IWW. Walter Douglas of Phelps Dodge came into Globe on a special train but refused to meet with McBride or Hunt. Apparently he meant only to strengthen the determination of the managers against the men, for his parting remarks, much publicized, were to the effect that all union men were "rattlesnakes" and should be deported.43 Hunt met formally with the managers only once and they informed him that since he had been appointed by the President, the would consent to meet him but would never conduct any business while he was present. Hunt accordingly left the meetings to McBride and spent his time listening to the miners and persuading them to conduct themselves in such a way that the group of pro-company townspeople called the Loyalty League would have no excuse for action against them. These efforts, he was convinced, prevented a deportation in Globe.44

Failing to make any headway with the managers, Hunt and McBride wired the Secretary of Labor to deal directly with Cleveland Dodge of Phelps Dodge, one of President Wilson’s closest friends. Nothing came of this effort, however, and the managers continued to insist that the mines were private property and would be run as their owners wished without any interference.45

Hunt was hampered in his efforts not only by the Loyalty League but also by the local newspaper, the Arizona Record, which was virulently hostile to him. The Record protested Hunt’s appointment vigorously, describing it as a German-inspired conspiracy to discredit Campbell by staging strikes and letting Hunt pretend to settle them.46 The paper also referred to him as "G. Wobbly P. Hunt," an allusion to his association with IWW members.47 "My position makes my blood boil," fumed Hunt helplessly, "…living here all my life being a factor in the upbuilding of the community, and then to get this treatment for trying to be fair and just is a shame."48 Everyone, he felt, was united against him and the workingmen, whose champion he was. "Labor which is the Source of Wealth here. The business element the courts sheriff, are all working in harmoney with the corporation also the press and one preacher, and the poor devil of a miner who goes down into the mine has not much to show."49

The attempts at mediation failed. The managers were determined to outlast the strikers. Frequent arrests, plus protection of strikebreakers by the Loyalty League and the troops, finally enabled the Old Dominion mine to reopen in August. Though the union leaders refused to call off the strike, their cause was now hopeless and the men gradually returned to work—if they could get permission slips from the Loyalty League. Hunt and McBride wired the Secretary of Labor that neither side would make any concessions and further efforts at mediation would be futile.50

Hunt had scarcely arrived in Globe as federal conciliator when even more serious trouble broke out in Bisbee. Much of the difficulty was apparently caused by company-hired detectives posing as IWW, but there were real grievances as well.

The miners protested that the companies were evading the anti-blacklist law by sending the men for physical examinations and telling the doctor which ones to turn down.51 The men also asked that blasting not be allowed during working shifts, that there be no discrimination against union members, and that the men receive a flat minimum wage rather than a sliding scale. Refusing even to meet with the grievance committee, the companies declared that the war made such demands "treasonable." The strike was called for the next day, 27 June, 1917.52

The problem of keeping order in Bisbee was solved locally. As soon as the strike was called, Campbell asked for federal troops, but General Greene’s representative reported that there was no need for them. Sheriff Harry Wheeler, with the help of the mine managers, had already organized a posse of 1,200 men, with another 1,000 in Douglas, for the purpose of arresting troublesome "strangers." Wheeler promised that those arrested would "be treated humanely and their cases examined with Justice and Care."53

In fact, however, it was the intention of the sheriff’s posse to deport 1,200 workers from the district in cattle box cars especially provided by the El Paso and Southwestern Railroad, a Phelps Dodge subsidiary. The deportation was carried out under tight security. All telephone and telegraph lines were seized and Campbell was not notified because it was thought, probably correctly, that he might have made some attempt to dissuade the posse. The vigilance committee took over the functions of the courts and men continued to be expelled from the district for several weeks.54

News of the mass deportation caused much alarm in Globe. Hunt was appalled and the workers were fearful that similar action might be taken against them. There were no deportations from Globe, but arrests increased.55

The men who had been so summarily evicted from their homes in Bisbee and deported were finally given shelter in a camp near Columbus, New Mexico, and cared for by the army. There were over 1,200 of them and of that number very few fit Wheeler’s description of agitating strangers or members of IWW. Although the men were free to leave the camp, most of them chose to remain, since the vigilantes of Bisbee would not allow them to return to their homes and neither the army nor any law-enforcement angency in Arizona would guarantee their protection.

Hunt, as soon as his usefulness at Globe was ended, went immediately to Columbus to discover what had happened and what he might do. He was deeply distressed by the stories of the men, many of whom were his old friends. "They crowded around me and all have faith in me it is pitiful," he exclaimed.56 It was a frustrating experience, for he lacked the authority to take any action. "Those 5 days that I spent in Columbus stand out as no other 5 days in my life. It seemed to me that I came in contact with the souls of men ‘as the poet sang.’"57

The Arizona Federation of Labor had wired President Wilson early in August asking him to "act in restoring law and order in Cochise County, Arizona, and return to their homes the deported men of Bisbee. Are we to assume that Phelps Dodge interests are superior to the principles of democracy…?" Wilson’s long and extremely close relationship with Cleveland Dodge may have made him unusually sensitive on this point for he replied indignantly that he was "loath to believe that genuine representatives of the Federation of Labor would send me a message containing so unjust and offensive an intimation."58

Three weeks later, as the deportations and vigilante control of Bisbee still continued and Wilson had taken no action, Hunt decided that he must "wire to the president I can not keep still any longer."59 In addition, he sent a full report to the Secretary of Labor, explaining that the men remained at Columbus because they wanted to be escorted to their homes from which they had been kidnapped and wanted their rights restored. Walter Douglas of Phelps Dodge, he said, was most to blame.60

This time President Wilson responded by appointing a mediation commission to visit the mining camps in Arizona and take testimony from all groups involved. Hunt worked closely with the commission, especially with Felix Frankfurter, then Assistant Secretary of Labor and a member of the commission. "The arrogance of the mine managers in snubbing me," Hunt said triumphantly. "Now I have this com. out here which I hope will see to the bottom of things. when mine managers are so defiant as to refuse to meet their men, and then again I think I could have been of some benefit but they…treated me with the greatest discourtesy one touch of nature will make the whole world kin, but they have no thought for humanity."61

The federal commission made a thorough investigation and concluded that the mining companies were primarily to blame. The grievances were real, but the companies would not allow any mediation machinery. The deportation itself, said the commission, was totally illegal and unjustified. 62 Hunt’s victory, however, was not complete, for attempts to convict those responsible for the deportations were futile.

Although Hunt returned to the governor’s office at the end of 1917, he was not successful in dealing with the mining companies. He had no National Guard at his command and the companies exerted every influence to keep the troops stationed in the mining camps since the military presence guaranteed the status quo. Hunt protested to little avail. "I brought out the fact that the mining cos furnish quarters light and water. what a turmoil would be raised if the miners were doing this…it is a Shame that the big interest can pull off such a stunt."63

A year later the troops were still in Globe and the people of the town were still bitterly divided. Returning to Globe to vote in the primary of 1918, Hunt noted sadly that "the old pioneer spirit of Globe which made us all love it seems to be dead with soldiers camped on the slag dump and numerous gun men employed by the mines…."64 The bitter feelings engendered by the strike and the continued activities of the Loyalty League had reached into every social group. "James Middle who has been here 40 years and a pillar of the IOOF [which Hunt had helped found] with 5 others has been expelled from the lodge."65 The scars left by the strikes of 1917 were slow to heal.66

Though Hunt retained his deep sympathy for workingmen, organized labor was never again during his lifetime a significant political force. The postwar depression merely reinforced the strong position the corporations had achieved in relation to labor during the strikes of 1917.

During the 1920s the copper industry gradually revived and wages, in comparison to the cost of living, improved. Attempts at unionization, however, were feeble, and opposition by industry was determined and effective. Adverse decisions in court cases during this period also contributed to the weakness of organized labor.

Since circumstances during the 1920s made workingmen’s organizations a relatively insignificant factor in Arizona politics, the decade lacked the drama of the Bisbee deportations. If such a crisis had occurred during that time, however, Hunt’s position would have been the same. His idealization of the laboring man never diminished, and the unpopularity of his stance never deterred him from complete commitment to a cause he believed to be just.

NOTES

1Letter, Hunt to Grover C. Graydon, 21 March 1919, Arizona Historical Society (AHS).

2Arizona Democrat, 26 March 1913; Arizona, Legislature, Senate, Walter Douglas letter to Senator C. B. Wood about mine taxes, 1st Leg., 3d spec. sess., 6 May 1913, Journal of the Legislature, p. 171; 3 May 1913, Senator Wood speaking for S.B. 3, opposition speech by Senator Whipple, p. 160.

3Hunt, "Diary," 5 February 1915. Arizona State University (ASU).

4Arizona, State Tax Commission, Biennial Report, 1916, pp. 7-86; 1918, p. 5; 1920, p. 5; 1922, p. 6; 1924, pp. 14, 16-17; 1926, pp. 10, 20; 1928, pp 7-8.

5Tax Commission, Report, 1916, p. 10; Dean E Mann, The Politics of Water in Arizona (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1963), pp. 69-70.

6Hunt, "Autobiography," typescript on microfilm, Arizona State Library and Archives (ASLA), Phoenix, p. 134.

7Hunt, "Diary," 15 May 1934.

8Letter, Hunt to John S. Cook, 27 February 1913; letter, Hunt to A. Hammons, 25 February 1913, ASLA.

9Letter, Hunt to L. B. Whitney, 15 January 1933, ASLA.

10James Robert Kluger, "The Clifton-Morenci Strike of 1915-1916" (M.A. thesis, University of Arizona, 1965), pp. 10-14 (published by the University of Arizona Press in 1970).

11Ibid., pp. 15-24.

12Telegram, Sheriff Jim Cash to Hunt, 14 September 1915, ASLA.

13Telegram, Cash to Hunt, 26 September 1915, ASLA.

14The Arizona Copper Company at Clifton was owned by a Scottish corporation. The Shannon Copper Company at Metcalf (a few miles from Morenci) was mostly Boston-owned but the Detroit Copper Company was owned by Phelps Dodge. Kluger, "Clifton-Morenci Strike," p. 5.

15Hunt, "Diary," 28 September 1915.

16Hunt, speech at Clifton, 30 September 1915, ASLA.

17Letter, Norman Carmichael (Arizona Copper Company), M. H. McLean (Detroit Copper Mining Company), and J. W. Bennie (Shannon Copper Company) to Hunt, 30 September 1915, ASLA.

18Hunt, statement on return from Clifton-Morenci, 1 or 2 of October 1915, ASLA.

19Letter, Hunt to Major H. H. Donkersley, 3 October 1915, ASLA.

20Arizona Republican, 30 July 1913, p. 4.

21Letter, Hunt to Charmichael et al., 5 October 1915, ASLA.

22Letter, Charmichael et al. to Hunt, 8 October 1915, ASLA.

23Hunt, "Autobiography," p. 158; Vernon H. Jensen, Heritage of Conflict: Labor Relationships in the Nonferrous Metals Industry Up to 1930 (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1950), p. 367. The following year, according to Hunt, the mining companies tried to persuade the state tax commission to credit $50,000 (the cost of operating the strikebreakers’ camp at Duncan) to their taxes. The commission refused. "Autobiography," p. 158. Mexican labor organizer Gutierrez de Lara, a personal friend of Hunt, had expressed the hope that the Duncan camp could be abolished, but Hunt reminded him that unless the law were broken, nothing could be done. Letter, Hunt to Gutierrez de Lara (at Morenci), 3 December 1915.

24Telegram, Colonel Charles Harris to Hunt, 8 October 1915, ASLA.

25Hunt, "The Strike Situation Reviewed," 27 October 1915, ASLA.

26Ibid., Ned Creighton, the agent for the mines in this transaction, later pleaded guilty in federal court and was fined $500 for violating a 1912 Act of Congress against publishing ads as news items. Arizona Republican, 11 March 1916.

27Ibid., 24 October 1915; 27, 28 October, 30 November, and 25 August 1916.

28Telegram, Sheriff Cash to Hunt, 26 January 1916, ASLA.

29Hunt, "Diary," 9 February 1916.

30Letter, Davies and Myers to Hunt, 10 February 1916, ASLA.

31Letter, Cash to Hunt, 22 June 1916, ASLA. The companies had reserved the right to rid themselves of those workers they regarded as disloyal members of the IWW.

32Clipping from The Public (Chicago), 11 February 1916, praising Hunt and comparing the strike to the Ludlow Massacre, ASLA. Brand Whitlock, Lincoln Steffens, and C. E. S. Wood were among the members of the editorial board of The Public. Clipping from Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen’s Magazine (January 1916), pp. 67-68, also praising Hunt and suggesting that his policies should have been followed in Colorado, ASLA.

33Thomas E. Campbell, "The I. W. W. in Arizona," Ms., p. 26, AHS. Because the Arizona National Guard was then absorbed into the regular army for wartime service, Campbell was expected to appeal to Greene, commanding officer of the district.

34Ibid., p. 42; Hunt, "Diary," 2 July 1917; telegram, President Wilson to Hunt, 2 July, 1917, ASLA.

35Campbell, "I. W. W.," p. 47.

36Campbell, "I. W. W.," pp. 28, 34, 41.

37"My work as an IWW representative is to visit the different mining camps, and as a member of the International, visit the local union’s office and its meetings and report as to how we can best carry on our campaign. We do not expect to establish permanent unions of the IWW in the camps at this time, but through creating of dissention among the members of the International we will destroy their locals and later, when there is no organization in the metalliferous mining industry, we will go in and organize, then call a convention, organizing a general independent movement, and later affiliate it with the IWW." Report by labor organizer Charles MacKinnon, as quoted in Jensen, Heritage of Conflict, p. 380.

38This was not Hunt’s first experience as a labor mediator in Globe. In 1902 he had acted as the representative of local businessmen to arrange an agreement with the Globe Miners Union after a dispute. Arizona Silver Belt, 16 October 1902, p. 1.

39Hunt, "Diary," 24 February 1919.

40Ibid., 12 October 1917.

41Letter, Hunt to G. C. Graydon, 2 December 1920, AHS.

42Hunt, "Diary," 24 July 1917; letter, Hunt to Fred Colter, 10 August 1917, ASLA; Robert Riell, "Life in Globe," Ms., AHS; Arizona, State Council of Defense, "Report of the Meeting of the Executive Committee…17 April 1918…." H. S. McCluskey Collection, Arizona Historical Foundation (AHF).

43Hunt, "Diary," 10-11 July, 1917; Arizona Record, 1 July 1917.

44Letter, Hunt to John Dunbar, 14 August 1917, ASLA.

45Hunt, "Diary," 15 and 25 July, 1917.

46Arizona Record, 11 July 1917. There was also strong protest against Hunt’s appointment in such mine-dominated towns as Douglas. Tucson Citizen, 7 July 1917, p. 3.

47Arizona Record, 7 August 1917, p. 1.

48Hunt, "Diary," 11 August 1917.

49Ibid., 8 August 1917.

50Hunt, Report to W. P. Wilson, Secretary of Labor, 17 August 1917, ASLA.

51Letter, Levie S. Gable to Hunt, 10 March 1915, ASLA.

52Campbell, "I. W. W.," p. 57. The best scholarly account of the Bisbee deportation is James Ward Byrkit, "Life and Labor in Arizona, 1901-1921: with Particular Reference to the Deportations of 1917" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School, 1972).

53Campbell, "I. W. W.," p. 48.

54Ibid., pp. 58-59; statements of witness to deportations made to Attorney General Wiley Jones, 8 August 1917, ASLA; also a great many letters to Hunt from miners and witnesses and victims, ASLA. The deportation, said Campbell, "was done with the knowledge and consent" of the county board of supervisors. "I. W. W.," p. 51.

55Hunt, "Diary," 12, 14, and 20 July 1917.

56Ibid., 22 August 1917.

57Letter, Hunt to Graydon, 15 October 1919, AHS.

58Ray Stannard Baker, ed., War Leader: April 6, 1917-February 28, 1918, Vol. 7 of Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters (8 vols., New York: Doubleday, Doran, 1927-1939), pp. 208-209.

59Hunt, "Diary," 30 August 1917.

60Hunt, "Report" to Secretary of Labor, 1 September 1917, ASLA.

61Hunt, "Diary," 6 and 7 October 1917.

62U.S. President, Report on the Bisbee Deportations (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1918).

63Hunt, "Diary," 16 January 1918.

64Ibid., 9 September 1918.

65Ibid., 10 September 1918.

66According to one scholar, the strike caused a change in the racial composition of Globe. Formerly many nationalities had been represented but after the strike most of the miners were Mexican. Wilma Gray Sain, "A History of the Miami Area, Arizona" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Arizona, 1944), p. 138.