For New Mexico: Hooker Dam on the Gila River above Duncan. (Cost included in the C.A.P. figure.)

For Nevada: The Las Vegas Aqueduct and related works. Presently the Las Vegas-Henderson area is in desperate need of new industrial and municipal water supplies, and the future growth of that valley is seriously threatened. A series of pumps would lift some of Nevada's 300,000 acre-feet of Colorado River water from Lake Mead and transmit it through an aqueduct into Las Vegas. Possible cost: $60 million.

For Utah: The Dixie Project. While most of Utah is in the Upper Basin, the watershed in Southwestern Utah flows into the Colorado below Lees Ferry, the dividing point between upper and lower basins. This project involves two dams on the Virgin River, which flows into Lake Mead. They would provide needed water for municipal, industrial and irrigation purposes in St. George, Cedar City and nearby communities. Possible cost: $45 million.

For California: A water salvage program. Hundreds of thousands of acre-feet of water are irretrievably lost each year because the Colorado River meanders and spreads through lowlands where salt cedar and other phreatophytes consume and waste water in huge quantities. Seepage and weeds waste more thousands of acre-feet. Cement linings of canals and channelization of the river might be financed out of "basin account" power revenues. Possible initial cost: $200 million.

Note this important incentive for California to cooperate rather than obstruct: engineers estimate that canal linings and river channelization could recapture as much as 500,000 acre-feet each year -- nearly half as much as California lost in the recently-concluded Arizona -California water suit.

2. A time-consuming step is saved. Under basic reclamation law a proposed plan must be circulated for 90 days to the affected states. C.A.P. was circulated in the 1940s and already meets this requirement.

3. A less costly plan is easier to sell. It is easier to pass a $1.1 billion bill than a $1.3 or $1.4 billion bill.

4. No complicated interstate agreements are required. Under a separate C.A.P. bill Arizona can go its own way, need not consider the wishes or problems of other states nor negotiate adjustments in order to develop a common plan.

5. This strategy is only a point of departure. We'll start with this; if the going get rough we can always switch to a regional plan.

2. Passage this year simply isn't in the cards. As I pointed out in my last report, there is virtually no possibility of congressional approval in 1963. Thus no time would be lost in circulating a new proposal. Granted that a regional plan might take until this fall to put together; since we can't get House hearings this year anyway, this might be a very fruitful use of our waiting period. Next January we might be in a position to go to Congress with a plan supported solidly by the delegations of all five affected states.

3. The regional plan represents only a modest increase in cost. If we were talking about a grandiose plan involving many billions of dollars, of course the support we gained from the Southwest might be lost in the East. However, the regional plan envisaged represents only a modest increase over our original one-state plan, and the point can be made that nearly 20 times as many people will benefit.

4. We need allies; it is dangerous to try "going it alone" in the 435-member House of Representatives. All states are equal in the Senate, and with Senator Carl Hayden on the job, it might be said that Arizona is "more equal than most." However, Arizona has only three votes in the House while California has 38, New York 41, etc. A separate C.A.P. might pass the Senate in 1963, but this could prove a costly victory if it stirred up strong objections in the House.

5. A regional plan may gain substantial California support; a separate C.A.P. cannot. California has recently become the nation's biggest state. Against its organized, coordinated, unified opposition C.A.P.'s chances are slight. With substantial California support our chances are good. I have talked with Senator Engle and key House members from California. Based on their statements to me, and reported statements of Governor Brown and Senator Kuchel, I am optimistic that a regional plan might gain, not just passive acquiescence, but active, vigorous support for C.A.P. One cannot downgrade the direct, real, attractive incentive for California. By cooperation with us the Golden State can regain half the water it lost in the suit. This is, in effect, creating or finding new, usable water which, for all practical purposes, does not now exist. It would be as though we had discovered a new tributary which would miraculously pour into the Colorado.

6. California has too much at stake to merely stall Arizona; its leaders are genuinely interested in the regional approach. Fears have been expressed that California is merely stalling again. Years of fruitless bickering have led many Arizonans, understandably, to discount California promises and expressions. But can we afford to harbor

I cannot praise too highly the statesmanship displayed in recent days by Governor Brown of California. Harassed by water partisans who would rekindle the old bitterness, he had the courage to say in late June: "I emphasize that it is our hope to cooperate, not only with Arizona, but also with the other affected states, to the end that the limited resources of the Colorado be employed prudently and with due regard for the rights of each. California will not attempt to win by obstruction what it has not won by litigation."

7. New Mexico, Nevada and Utah will actively work for a regional bill. There is a vast difference between mere lip service (or voting for a bill) and enthusiastically working, planning and selling a bill. The congressional members from these three states hold key positions in this battle. If they are active, interested parties working for the welfare of their own states, this could make the difference between defeat and victory.

8. The upper basin has set a precedent. Until recent years water planning was state-wide only. In 1956, under the leadership of Senator Anderson of New Mexico and Representative Aspinall of Colorado a $1.3 billion regional approach was developed for the Upper Basin states. Lower Basin congressmen fought for and aided passage of the Upper Basin plan; we can expect reciprocity on a similar plan for our basin. The unified Lower Basin states can present a sound and powerful argument to the House: "We ask not a gigantic, expensive bill for one state; we ask only that you do for the Lower Colorado what you did in 1956 for the Upper Colorado."

9. The Kennedy administration is more likely to support a basin plan. Support from the administration in power is always critical for major legislation, for undecided votes often follow its lead. In this connection, the New York Times wrote on June 13: "The administration is nearly committed to a broad-scale regional approach to the problems of the Southwest. It is unlikely that the administration would approve the Central Arizona Project in view of the 1964 elections. If it did, it could be courting trouble in California with its big bloc of 40 electoral votes." In addition, the Budget Bureau, approval of which is essential, is much more likely to approve a regional plan than C.A.P. as the fairest and most comprehensive plan for Southwestern water development.

10. Key congressional leaders are more likely to work for a regional plan. As indicated in my last report, perhaps the most important single member of Congress concerned with our bill -- since the major battle will be in the House -- is Chairman Aspinall, one of the fathers of the basin idea. Speaking of such a comprehensive and coordinated plan, he said, "Time has demonstrated that the burgeoning water requirements of the lower Basin can be effectively satisfied in no other way." I believe Rep. John Saylor, the ranking Republican on the House Interior Committee, and Senator Clinton Anderson, ranking Democrat and former chairman of the Senate Interior Committee, are of the same opinion.