This chapter was written by two managers, Gary Cummins and Bill Dickinson, who served consecutively as superintendents of the USS Arizona Memorial from 1980 through 1988.
The USS ARIZONA, USS UTAH and Pearl Harbor surveys, a five-year project to inventory those cultural resources, contributed to our knowledge of the historical significance of submerged cultural resources within Pearl Harbor National Historic Landmark. As a result of these surveys, managers at the USS Arizona Memorial have become aware of the unique and complex issues surrounding submerged-resource protection, and have learned how acute the need is for decisions affecting future preservation policy.
As site managers responsible for an internationally significant submerged cultural resource, we have wrestled with management decisions that had precious few guidelines and precedents, If other National Park Service managers are wrestling with similar issues and making different decisions, NPS will be perpetuating inconsistencies in management practices.
Should we be doing anything to preserve shipwrecks in place? What about shipwrecks that are also grave sites? Should we let the natural processes continue unimpaired? Should we be looking for means to slow or stop deterioration? Should we be retrieving significant artifacts? Should we, for example, remove the 14-inch guns from the USS ARIZONA so they can be displayed and people can see them before they are lost to corrosion? Should we document wrecks with known dead? Should we merely monitor the deterioration process, noting changes in conditions that occur over time but allowing deterioration to continue? Should we be diving on such submerged grave sites? Should we penetrate them? Some people argue that we are disturbing the final resting place of those who perished by diving on these wrecks. If we don't dive them, how do we learn enough to make responsible management decisions regarding health, safety and appropriate visitor use?
As we continue to study submerged cultural resources, we will gain more experience -- and answers. Equally important, we will better understand what future questions to ask.
When the National Park Service took over operation of the USS ARIZONA Memorial in late 1980, it was faced with two fundamental concerns: interpretation and management. The public was insatiably curious about the Pearl Harbor attack, but we lacked enough accurate information to satisfy this curiosity. We had wrongly assumed that the great volume of reports, surveys, eyewitness and historical accounts would enable us to answer all questions about the Pearl Harbor attack. But though we were able to handle most of the basic questions, the many gaps in the historic record left many others unanswered. The second concern was resource management. Although the Navy actually owned the battleship USS ARIZONA, we found Navy officials relatively unconcerned about its preservation -- they had their hands full with floating ships. The public was concerned over the ARIZONA's upkeep, and furthermore believed since the National Park Service operated the USS ARIZONA Memorial, it must own the battleship. In those early days the National Park Service had very little experience in preserving large, steel, sunken ships.
Another concern relating to interpretation was the view of the American people, who perceive the USS ARIZONA Memorial less as a historic site than as a shrine similar to the Alamo or the Custer Battlefield. This pervasive view made it difficult for park interpreters to separate myth from fact, and made it especially important that all interpretive information be absolutely accurate.
After a period of time, we were able to develop an interpretive program that combined verbal presentations, a documentary film and eyewitness accounts by survivors of the attack, which answered most visitor questions. Exceptions were the many questions about the ship itself, mostly variations of "what does it look like?"
During the 40th anniversary celebration of Pearl Harbor held in Honolulu in 1981, we had an opportunity to talk with several former crew members of the USS ARIZONA and the repair ship USS VESTAL, which had been moored alongside the ARIZONA during the attack. Several told of seeing torpedo tracks streaking toward the ships, running under the VESTAL and striking the ARIZONA near the bow. These accounts were at odds with official Navy records, which attributed all of the ARIZONA's damage to aerial bombs.
The alleged torpedo tracks could have come from either torpedoes dropped by the Japanese Nakajima B5N "Kate" torpedo-bombers, or launched from the two midget submarines that penetrated the harbor during the raid. It was an interesting issue that we lacked evidence to resolve.
I began to discuss the possibility of an underwater survey of the ARIZONA with Rear Admiral Stanley Anderson, Commander Naval of the Pearl Harbor Navy Base (COMNAVBASE) and his staff. COMNAVBASE controlled the waters of Pearl Harbor, so its permission was necessary for any work there. Admiral Anderson seemed amenable, but members of his staff were aghast.
The COMNAVBASE staff, like many other Navy officers, could not understand why we would want to investigate something about which "everything was known." When we told them the things we didn't know, such as the torpedo issue, general condition of the ship, and exact location of other damage, they were still puzzled. At issue was the basic difference between the Navy's mission and methods and our own. The Navy is used to operating in a atmosphere of security that insulates much of its activity from public scrutiny, while the National Park Service seems to operate under a microscope. The Navy felt that the public had no business asking such questions, and that we could simply refuse to answer them. "Why not leave well enough alone?" was the standard response.
Finally, Navy officials were worried about the sanctity of the site. More than 1,100 sailors and marines had gone down with the ship. The idea of conducting a survey amid their remains was repugnant. One officer -- who later strongly supported the survey -- warned that "poisonous gases" trapped within the ship, possibly from the decomposing bodies of the dead crew, would have lethal effects on trespassing divers. I recognized that I had to do more homework in order to present a proposal that would satisfy Navy concerns.
We decided on an interim approach. When a new commander, Rear Admiral Conrad J. Rorie, relieved Admiral Anderson, I requested permission for Park Service divers to sweep the ARIZONA to remove the thousands of coins visitors had tossed from the memorial over the years. These coins formed an inches-deep carpet covering the ship, clearly visible from the memorial. I appealed to the Navy sense of order by pointing out that the appearance was unseemly. I added that coins containing copper tend to kill marine organisms that cover the ship with a protective coral glaze. COMNAVBASE agreed with this view, and we began "clean up" dives in early 1983.
1 made the first surface dives on the ARIZONA, accompanied by Chief Ranger John Martini. Using masks, fins and snorkels, we loaded many pounds of coins into plastic buckets hung from the memorial for subsequent disposal. These coins, incidentally, became a major issue. Technically they were accountable federal property. However, when we tried to deposit the coins, banks refused to accept them. We approached the Treasury Department for advice but it never responded. As time went on we accumulated thousands of coins from all over the world, which we diligently stored in bags in the basement of the USS ARIZONA Memorial visitor center.
While gathering coins, Martini and I took the opportunity to swim over the entire ship to get an idea of its appearance and condition. The presence of silt and oil leaking from the ARIZONA's wreckage made it obvious that surface diving would not be adequate for our needs. Toward the bow, once past the remains of the superstructure and crew's galley, we could make out no more than a ghostly outline of the hull and the two main forward gun turrets. Toward the stern, in shallower water, we could brush aside silt and find the teak decking in good condition after more than 40 years.
Although the surface dives were inadequate for our needs, they did provide useful information from which to develop a broad research design for an underwater project. From the beginning I wanted to treat the ARIZONA as an archeological site, and to use archeological methodology to get at the information we needed for management needs and decisions.
In August 1982 Dan Lenihan, Chief of the National Park Service's Submerged Cultural Resources Unit in Santa Fe, visited the Arizona Memorial. It didn't take much persuasion to get him into the water on another coin expedition. After Dan's introduction to the USS ARIZONA, the concept of an underwater archeological project really began to take shape.
Dan's concept was to use terrestrial archeological methodology underwater to recover data that would meet the park's management needs and advance the science of underwater archeology. In formulating this concept, I gave Dan a list of management issues lacking data. He then developed a strategy that would meet the most rigorous archeological standards while providing the park with the needed information.
The list that I passed to Dan was as follows:
To answer the Navy's (and the public's) concerns about the sanctity of the ARIZONA, we agreed that under no condition would divers enter the hull. Thus we could reassure everyone that the remains of more than 1, 100 sailors and marines would rest undisturbed.
Dan also recommended that the survey be conducted over a two-year period, with the first year devoted to approximately two weeks of initial survey that would concentrate on the ARIZONA's bow section. This would permit a better estimate of the manpower, time and money needed to carry out the entire project.
When we took the refined proposal to Admiral Rorie at COMNAVBASE, we were much better received. No problems had occurred with our coin-recovery dives. Admiral Rorie and his staff were impressed with Dan Lenihan's credentials and overall approach to the project. In fact, COMNAVBASE asked us to help find a solution to its own USS ARIZONA problem!
During the 1942 salvage operation, the Navy had cut away structure from the ARIZONA and stored the pieces at a remote location within the base. Over the years, entrepreneurs had made several attempts to obtain fragments of the ship for such uses as manufacturing religious items for the tourist market. The fragments were too badly cut up and corroded for use in the visitor center museum. COMNAVBASE decided the safest course was to remove the several tons of steel from the storage site, barge them to a point near the memorial and "bury them at sea." Admiral Rorie asked if we could map a spot as near as possible to the ship where the scrap could be dumped. In return, he offered us the support of Pearl Harbor's Mobile Dive and Salvage Unit One, complete with a sizeable dive boat! We promptly agreed, and we added location of a suitable site for the ARIZONA wreckage to our list of project goals.
The Arizona Memorial Museum Association, the USS Arizona Memorial's cooperating association, agreed to underwrite the entire cost of the project, with assistance from Carol Lim, the Arizona Memorial food concessioner. Finally in the early fall of 1983 we were ready to begin a project that would provide information for our two fundamental concerns -- interpretation and resource management, while addressing our "shrine" concern by not violating the sanctity of the last resting place of the ARIZONA's crew. The rest, as they say, is history.
The USS ARIZONA project began in 1983 with documentation of the 608-foot-long USS ARIZONA. Gary Cummins was site manager during the first phase of the project, until 1985. 1 took over from 1985 to 1988. We both felt we were operating in a fishbowl. How many times does a park manager contend with 5,000 visitors a day and the media, all fascinated with diving researchers in the waters below? The project's high visibility required intense and constant involvement of the superintendent -- it was not a task that could be kept at arm's length.
The challenge was to document in detail the remains of a battleship that was sunk over 45 years ago. Until the documentation project began, we didn't really know what was there. For example, we didn't realize there were 5-inch guns still on USS UTAH. We thought everything had been recovered during the initial salvage operations.
As a result of the work done by NPS and the Navy, the American people now, for the first time, have an accurate drawing of a highly significant historical resource that receives international attention. A detailed model created from the drawings gives memorial visitors a much better understanding of the USS ARIZONA as it exists today. The model also serves as a planning tool to assist in developing future research initiatives. In addition, we have established permanent stations on the site and collected baseline data on the ship and surrounding marine environment for longitudinal monitoring.
The drawings and model enabled us to answer many questions about the ship. We were able to determine, for example, that above the silt there are no torpedo hits on the USS ARIZONA. Speculation had said that the ship was sunk by torpedoes. We now know that there is no evidence above the silt to support that view. We also have been able to precisely identify the origin of the oil that has seeped to the surface every few minutes since the USS ARIZONA was sunk. Because the ship had been refueled shortly before the attack, the resulting oil slick has become a visual feature of the site that has been the subject of interpretation over the years.
We know the extent of corrosion, as well as the extent, density and composition of biofouling growth and silt that cover the vessel. We determined the condition of the teak deck and the location of significant artifacts that are still on the deck. We were able to determine that the 14-inch guns are still mounted on the No. 1 gun turret.
The USS ARIZONA and the USS UTAH are not just memorials, they are marine science and historical preservation "workshops" explaining the history that occurred here. They are ecological barometers over an exact period of time that can be used to track water quality in Pearl Harbor.
That portion of the USS UTAH that is above water very pointedly illustrates the rapid deterioration occurring to cultural resources in Pearl Harbor. Before long the exposed structure will be gone. Whether deterioration can ever be arrested is an open question. However, at least these structures have now been documented.
Now that the USS UTAH and USS ARIZONA have been studied, we will be able to compare two important shipwrecks in the same harbor. We will be able to study on each the biofouling and rate of corrosion, and cross-check data between the ships to see if any events are unique or similar.
Each new operation has asked and answered new questions, and developed new techniques. With the established monitoring stations on the USS ARIZONA we can record changes in biofouling. This documentation will enable us to record and monitor changes in the underwater environment that alter the rate of biofouling, which affects the rate of corrosion. We know, for example, that Pearl Harbor used to be a dumping ground for sewage. Ironically, the sewage may have contributed to the ship's preservation by creating a very fertile environment for marine growth. As a result, both the USS ARIZONA and the USS UTAH have experienced abundant biofouling growth. This same dense growth has created a thick, protective, anaerobic coating over both hulls. With reduced oxygen, underwater corrosion was significantly lessened. However, with antipollution efforts in full swing to clean up Pearl Harbor, the density of biofouling growth is decreasing. The nutrient level in the harbor is significantly lower than it was during World War II. Although cleaning up the harbor is a positive concept, it may be somewhat negative in terms of marine growth protecting the hulls. How rapidly are we losing the marine life that has helped protect the ship? Will other types of marine life appear that are equally as beneficial to the ship's fabric? Will the growth already in place be adequate, or is there a need for more? Our monitoring will help answer such questions. We plan to develop a computer model of the rate of corrosion.
During the summer of 1988, using Navy MDSU and EOD divers and submarine base support, NPS surveyed select locations in and directly outside Pearl Harbor. Although nothing of historical significance was discovered in the harbor, that negative evidence is important: We now know which areas have no significant remains above the silt, a finding that can influence decisions made in future harbor management by the Navy. During this period, the EOD team working with SCRU made a very exciting side-scan contact in the survey of the defensive perimeter outside the harbor. We established liaison with the University of Hawaii Undersea Research Laboratory, which assisted us in following up on this contact with a possible WWII Japanese midget submarine used during the Pearl Harbor attack. The full significance of that aspect of the survey is still to be determined, because at the time of this report, the contact was not confirmed.
With limited NPS funding and personnel to devote to the preservation of submerged cultural resources, Project SeaMark established an important precedent by allowing park managers to avail themselves of an extensive array of military assets that included people, equipment and supplies. By working cooperatively with the Navy, NPS was able to utilize both active and reserve Navy capabilities to accomplish project objectives. The Navy augmented Park Service underwater archeologists with divers primarily from the Naval reserves to assist in charting, mapping, surveying and photographing these resources.
Navy-NPS cooperation began in 1983 with active-duty divers from MDSU One and Park Service personnel. Since 1986 most Navy input has come from reservists, with less involvement by active-duty divers.
The significance of Project SeaMark is many-fold. From the broadest perspective, joint ventures like this serve national interests and, ultimately, the taxpayers. SeaMark brought together disparate federal resources to accomplish management objectives in a cost-effective manner. We took personnel and equipment resources that would otherwise have been expended on contrived Naval reserve or active MDSU training projects and assisted the Navy in redirecting those assets toward existing projects of international significance. The Naval reservists and active-duty personnel were able to simulate mobilization assignments while addressing real diving problems at real sites. They were forced to use creative approaches to overcome difficulties and successfully complete the projects. Even the logistics of moving personnel and equipment to the site was realistic mobilization training. Project participants spent much more time in the water than during a simulated exercise designed to offer the same kind of training.
The submarine base provided man-power and equipment support. The Naval Ocean Systems Center provided a marine biologist who was an expert on Pearl Harbor biofouling; the Pearl Harbor Naval Ship Yard contributed a metallurgist; the University of Hawaii contributed the resources of the Hawaii Undersea Research Laboratory (including its three-man submersible); and PACDIV provided sounding charts for Middle Loch and support of a Navy archeologist.
We have learned a great deal from these projects, and they will serve as a foundation for more productive ventures between active and Naval Reserve units, other support groups and the National Park Service.
The question of "to preserve, or not to preserve" underwater cultural resources has yet to be answered. Meanwhile, we are exploring methods of stabilization.
A principal reason for developing a submerged-cultural-resource management program for the USS ARIZONA and USS UTAH sites -- and Pearl Harbor in general -- is to clearly define strategies for site preservation. Options range from leaving sites alone (benign neglect) to sustaining the existing condition and integrity (preservation). A third choice is partial restoration, that is, removal of post-December 7, 1941 mooring quays, flagstaff and mooring chains. Doing nothing would, of course, eventually result in deterioration and destruction of the shipwreck.
Preservation decisions for the USS ARIZONA are complicated by a recognition that the sunken shipwreck is not only a resource of major historical significance, it is also a symbol to the American people of the beginning of World War 11. Finally, it is the final place for honored war dead.
Memorial architect Alfred Preis, who was aware of the symbolic aspects of the USS ARIZONA, designed the structure to be symbolically linked to the shipwreck below. Although appropriate from a design and viewing standpoint, this linkage has become a cause for confusion for USS ARIZONA managers.
One pivotal point in managing the USS ARIZONA is determining the ship's period of historical significance. One view defines that period as a single day: December 7, 1941. Or the significant period could be considered the period from December 7, 1941 through the salvage operations, when temporary mooring quays were attached to the ship and Navy officials decided not to further salvage the vessel. But if the memorial structure is considered along with the ship, an option that we believe is inappropriate, then the entire memorialization process is also of significance. If viewed separately, should the memorial even receive consideration as historically significant? It is a unique design, but would seem of little actual historical significance in any other context.
It seems that we first need to define the memorial/USS ARIZONA relationship from a historic-preservation standpoint, then define the period of historical significance and decide whether to view it as a site or process. Once we have defined the significant period, we will be able to define the appropriate level of preservation.
The fact that the sunken ship is also a tomb containing the remains of more than 1,000 sailors and marines could be either an argument for preservation or an argument for nonintervention. The preservation view argues the need to protect the tomb's integrity, respecting it as the final resting place for so many; to allow deterioration may be considered disrespectful. The natural-deterioration view says doing anything at all would disturb the grave site, and thus be disrespectful ("these sailors and marines have been declared buried at sea so let's let them rest in peace").
Another consideration that must not be overlooked is the environmental impact of the ship's deterioration. Oil continues to leak from the ARIZONA. If the hull were to collapse, an unknown quantity of additional oil would be released. The potential for a large spill does exist.
Regardless of the period of historical significance selected and the preservation option, the authors affirm the need for a continuing research project to monitor, document, analyze and determine the type, rate and cause of deterioration. Findings and recommendations of such research are needed not only to determine the ship's present condition, but also the appropriate treatment for a historic structure, a symbol and a vault for war dead. Also needed are ongoing data returns for monitoring future deterioration and determining the existing and projected rate of corrosion. A laboratory analysis of the ship's metal will be required to make such determinations.
Other USS ARIZONA management issues that remain unanswered include: (1) What to do about the rusting remains of the USS ARIZONA's superstructure that had been removed during the salvage operations and dumped on the nearby Waipio Peninsula in Pearl Harbor? (2) What to do about the mooring quays that were attached to the partially submerged USS ARIZONA during salvage operations in Pearl Harbor? (3) What to do about the nonhistoric flagstaff attached to the ship's masts? (4) What to do about the mooring chains between the hull and the memorial dock? and (5) What to do about the USS ARIZONA's original mooring quays?
It has been suggested that the remains of the superstructure, now mostly unrecognizable, should be taken to the site and dumped alongside, because they are considered to be part of the historic scene. But there are serious questions about this course of action: The materials were never actually located alongside the ship, and to put them there would be inconsistent with the historic context. An alternative may be to identify those pieces of particular interest for display in the USS ARIZONA Memorial Museum, leaving the rest in place with the stipulation that it is available for appropriate museum display, but may not be used for commercial gain.
Action on the mooring quays, which are attached to the ship fabric, is related to the question of what historic scene should be represented? What historic period should the USS ARIZONA's remains reflect -- the period up to December 7, 1941; or including the post-December 7 activities, such as the salvage operation in Pearl Harbor, and even the USS ARIZONA memorialization process itself? A decision as to which historic period the remains should reflect permits managers to recommend removal or non-removal of the mooring quays. Any future actions on the mooring quays should be based on future research regarding the physical state of the shipwreck's fabric. As a practical matter, removal of the mooring quays may cause more structural damage to the ship than leaving them, regardless of the determined period of historical significance.
Daily raising of the American flag on the memorial honors those who fought and died. Although that flag was not a part of the December 7, 1941 historic fabric, removing it would most certainly be politically sensitive. If it is determined that the period of historical significance includes the memorialization process, then the flagstaff becomes historically significant. One must also address the flagstaff's present influence on the ship's destruction, and related safety issues. It extends 50 feet into the air and is placing a great deal of stress on the rusting mast, which eventually will fail. This is accelerating the mast's rate of deterioration as well as creating a safety hazard. If the mast fails and the flagstaff falls, it could harm visitors and cause damage to the memorial structure. Alternatives include stabilizing the ship's mast (fill it with concrete?) or removing the flagstaff. One option is to attach the latter to the memorial and extend it down to the ship's deck. Another option is to allow it to remain attached to the mast and support it with ties to the memorial.
The weight-mooring chains are causing deterioration of the historic ship fabric. However, removal may be even more destructive. An alternative is to cut the chains at the edge of the deck so the weight is eliminated. The chain on the deck would remain in place. Chain removal is directly related to the dock. Prior to any action, the importance of the chains relative to the dock would have to be determined and a replacement alternative installed.
The USS ARIZONA's original mooring quays should have a distinct preservation plan. They could be maintained as they are (with the names of the USS ARIZONA and the USS VESTAL painted on their side), restored to their original December 7, 1941 appearance, or left alone. The question of replacement, should they collapse, also needs to be addressed.
Resource-management issues can be grouped into five main categories: (1) protection of the USS ARIZONA, (2) protection of the memorial, (3) protection of historic materials/artifacts and the museum collection, (4) protection of the water area (historic zone) surrounding the sunken ship and memorial, (5) protection of resources in or close to Pearl Harbor but outside NPS operational responsibility.
Lacking both authorizing legislation and a general management plan, decisions in management of submerged cultural resources should be based on the purposes for which the park was established, as defined in the Statement for Management (August 1983):
To preserve and interpret the tangible historical resources associated with the December 7,1941 attack on Pearl Harbor. Of primary importance are the sunken wreck of the USS ARIZONA, which serves as the final resting place for the battleship's sailors and marines killed in that attack, and the large concrete memorial to all those killed in the attack, which straddles the ship.
The Interpretive Prospectus (October 1981), which sets the historical context for the entire park through identification of primary interpretive themes also provides guidance for resource management. The park's interpretive themes have been identified as:
The prospectus continues:
The USS ARIZONA as a historic artifact derives much of its significance in relation to the attack on Pearl Harbor and in turn on the outbreak of war. The order of thematic emphasis ensues from the nature of a memorial and the necessity of placing primary emphasis on interpretation of resources at hand.
The prospectus suggests that the appropriate historic context for the ship should center on Dec. 7, 1941, which would limit interpretation primarily to resources that are presently on site (not adding to or deleting from the historical structure).
If full preservation is to be the appropriate level of treatment, then it follows that a historic structure report for the USS ARIZONA is needed. Some of the has baseline information is already in existence, derived from data obtained from recent projects run by the NPS Submerged Cultural Resources Unit between 1983 and 1988. The historic structure report is needed to evaluate the research finding and make recommendations for preservation of the USS ARIZONA.
The historic structure report should cover not only the appropriate treatment for the shipwreck itself (e.g., continued monitoring of the level and extent of corrosion/fouling, preservation technique and the need for a corrosion model), but should also address the need for artifact recovery from the shipwreck, and removal of the flagstaff, mooring decks, and mooring chains.
The nature and scope of the historic tructure report's recommendations will assist park managers in deciding whether a historic structure preservation guide is warranted.
The purpose of such a guide would be to direct the needed maintenance activities to preserve and protect the USS ARIZONA, both as a historic structure (shipwreck) and as a tomb for war dead. The guide would be tailored to the specific preservation needs of the USS ARIZONA, and would provide information for orderly, timely and appropriate inspection, monitoring and maintenance. The guide would also provide the means to evaluate maintenance activities to determine gaps or weaknesses and to adopt corrective measures. As additional data are obtained, modifications or additions may need to be made in the guide.
Under present CRM guidelines, possibly the USS ARIZONA can not be regarded as a historic structure and therefore preservation treatment may be inappropriate. The memorial, however, does fit the definition of a cultural resource (NPS-28, Glossary, Appendix A, page 5) and should be regarded as more than just a structure. The memorial's reason to be is the USS ARIZONA -- it is inextricably tied to the ship. The relationship between the memorial and the ship becomes clear when one considers the chains securing the memorial boat dock to the shipwreck and the flagstaff, which appears to be part of the memorial but is actually attached to the ship's superstructure. We need more information to determine what effect these links have on the memorial and the sunken ship.
Periodic assessment of the condition of the memorial pilings is needed. An initial inspection, conducted with the Naval Facilities Engineering Command for the NPS in 1987, suggests the pilings are structurally sound. There may be a need to develop a separate structure report and guide for the memorial, or include the memorial structure as part of the report and guide for the USS ARIZONA. Since the two structures are so different, it may make sense to deal with each separately. The guide prepared for the memorial would serve as a reference for programming routine and cyclic maintenance, including the boat dock, the pilings, and so on.
It is unclear what our role should be in the documentation and preservation of other Pearl Harbor-related cultural resources (USS UTAH, battleship row mooring quays, possible downed aircraft or sunken mini-sub). The identification and documentation of such resources would seem to be the minimally acceptable effort.
The park needs to immediately program for a research project for continuous monitoring of the condition of the sunken hull and superstructure. As soon as sufficient data are obtained, the preparation of a historic structures report should be undertaken and, assuming preservation is recommended, a preservation guide should follow.
The primary goal of an action plan is to develop a cultural resources management program for the USS ARIZONA battleship and memorial structure. As a follow-up to the underwater surveys of the USS ARIZONA and USS UTAH, the program should inform park managers on the status and condition of the resources, provide a long-term plan to protect and preserve the resources, and clarify specific objectives to reach these goals. The action plan should be incorporated into the overall Resources Management Plan for the park.
Gary and I both believe that it is imperative to determine the historically significant period of USS ARIZONA, then to agree on what degree of preservation and monitoring the ship merits. We also need to address the question of whether the actions we could take will be more or less beneficial than allowing natural deterioration processes to continue.